I study settings in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers, characterized by cost types, must invest in attributes before they compete for partners in a frictionless, continuum assignment market. I define Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite's 
Introduction
In this paper, I study the efficiency of two-sided investments in large one-to-one matching economies with a frictionless post-investment assignment market. The model and analysis build on a seminal article by Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001a, henceforth (CMP)), but I allow for more general investment choices and match surplus functions, and for more general forms of ex-ante heterogeneity of agents. The main goal of the paper is to shed light on what enables and what constrains, or even precludes, investment coordination failures in ex-post contracting equilibrium (see below). Such coordination failures may result in mismatch of agents (from an ex-ante perspective) and/or pairwise inefficient investments.
Consider a continuum of buyers and sellers. All agents must first, simultaneously and non-cooperatively, invest in costly attributes. In the second stage (ex-post), they compete for partners in a frictionless one-to-one matching market, pair off and divide a surplus that depends on both parties' investments. Agents are ex-ante heterogeneous, differing in their costs for making the various possible investments, and they have quasilinear utility functions. Utility is transferable (TU), and the technology is deterministic in the sense that investments determine attributes and attributes determine (gross) surplus. Like (CMP), I label agents "sellers" and "buyers," but one could equally call them "workers," who have to invest in human capital before they try to find a job, and "firms," who must invest in physical capital before they hire a worker. Competitive equilibria of the ex-post continuum transferable utility assignment game Zame 1992, 1999 ) feature an efficient (surplus-maximizing) matching of buyers and sellers on the basis of their sunk investments. The appropriate equilibrium notion for the two-stage model is less obvious.
2 I use ex-post contracting equilibrium, which is the solution concept proposed by (CMP). Every attribute choice has to respond optimally, given the agent's costs, to the correctly anticipated trading possibilities and payoffs in the equilibrium market. An agent who deviates by choosing an otherwise non-existent attribute can match with any marketed attribute from the other side, leave (slightly more than) the equilibrium payoff to the partner and keep the remaining surplus. This pins down payoffs outside of the equilibrium support. Alternatively, one could require that individual investments must be optimal with respect to a market-clearing payoff (price) system for all ex-ante possible attributes. Such equilibria always exist, and they entail ex-ante efficient investments and match-ing. 3 In particular, coordination failures are ruled out. However, by assuming that investments are directed by a price system that attaches market prices to attributes from the other side that nobody chooses, one essentially ignores that sunk investments determine actual trading possibilities. Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2013, pg. 537) remark: "On the one hand, we find the existence of such prices counterintuitive.
On the other hand and more importantly, like Makowski and Ostroy (1995) , we expect coordination failures to be endemic when people must decide what goods to market, and hence we think it important to work with a model that does not preclude them." (CMP) assumed i) that buyers and sellers choose between one-dimensional investment levels, ii) that agents can be completely ordered in terms of their marginal cost of investment, and iii) that gross surplus is a strictly supermodular function of investment levels. 4 Combining the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing conditions of this "1-d supermodular framework" with the absence of hold-up problems, 5 (CMP) proved that there always is an equilibrium in which all agents invest and match efficiently. They also gave examples of inefficient equilibria in which parts of both populations under-invest (over-invest) because suitable complementary investments are missing. Moreover, (CMP) showed that these coordination failures are ruled out if agents are very heterogeneous ex-ante. I use the Kantorovich duality theorem from the mathematical theory of optimal transport (Villani 2009 ) to define ex-post contracting equilibrium in more general environments. The duality theorem characterizes all stable and feasible bargaining outcomes, i.e. pairs of efficient matching and core payoff function (equivalently, competitive equilibria, see Section 2), of any continuous assignment game (Shapley and Shubik 1971; Zame 1992, 1999) . Consequently, the model allows for the representation of quite general preference relations both before and after investment. 6 Maybe most importantly, the attributes that determine surplus are inherently multi-dimensional in many interesting settings. Investment choices affect several relevant quality and/or skill dimensions, and they may lead to forms of endogenous specialization that cannot be represented in a one-dimensional model (regardless of supermodularity). Accordingly, it is often necessary to use multi-dimensional cost types for modeling ex-ante heterogeneity. I verify first that virtually any stable and feasible bargaining outcome of the benchmark assignment game in which buyers and sellers can bargain and write complete contracts before they invest, so that partners choose jointly optimal attributes, can be supported by an ex-post contracting equilibrium ((CMP)'s nice explicit proof heavily used the conditions of the 1-d supermodular framework).
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The important open task is to shed light on the complex interplay of technology (surplus and cost functions), competition and exogenous heterogeneity that determines whether inefficient equilibria are possible and, if so, what kind of coordination failures may occur. In the 1-d supermodular framework, matching has to be positively assortative in any equilibrium, both ex-post, in investment levels, and from the ex-ante view, in cost types. While it may sometimes happen that investments are not jointly optimal, there can never be any mismatch of buyers and sellers. By contrast, beyond the 1-d supermodular framework it is a priori unclear which matching patterns can occur in equilibrium.
A preliminary observation is very useful. Due to competition ex-post ("no holdup"), every agent's investment has to maximize net surplus conditional on the attribute of his partner: for all equilibrium pairs, attribute choices form a Nash equilibrium of a hypothetical "full appropriation" (FA) game. In this game, both agents internalize their investment's full net effect on joint surplus. Starting from this simple property of equilibria, I gain significant insights into the main sources, forms and limitations of coordination failure in a sequence of different environments.
Jointly optimal attributes are always a Nash equilibrium of the FA game between a buyer and a seller. If FA games have multiple equilibria for some pairs (and not all Nash profiles maximize actual net surplus), this technological multiplicity is a key source of potential inefficiency. In the 1-d supermodular framework, technological multiplicity is necessary for inefficiency. Beyond that framework, mismatch is sometimes possible even if equilibria of FA games are unique (Section 5.2.1). On the other hand, I find that the absence of technological multiplicity also restricts mismatch (Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). In such cases, jointly optimal attributes (and hence equilibrium investments) depend continuously on the types of partners. Moreover, any attribute choice shows the agent's specialization for the intended match, but it also strongly reflects his own cost type. Therefore, marketed attributes are potentially attractive targets for deviations by types that are not too different from the agent's partner, especially if these types would be more suitable matches for the agent ex-ante. Profitable deviations must be ruled out by sufficiently high equilibrium payoffs. These requirements constrain mismatch and may even completely preclude it, in particular if agents are ex-ante differentiated (not necessarily very heterogeneous) and/or attributes very strongly depend on own cost types. In some environments, it is possible to check for coordination failures by going through all possible cases, or by using a lot of a priori knowledge about the structure of equilibria (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). In more complex settings, one has to use the characterization of ex-ante efficient matchings that is implied by the Kantorovich duality theorem to evaluate whether (local and/or global) mismatches are possible. I provide an example of such an analysis in Section 5.2.3.
(CMP)'s examples reveal that severe coordination failures can happen in environments with technological multiplicity. These problems are exacerbated outside of the 1-d supermodular framework (Section 5.3). In particular, mismatch is a common feature of inefficient equilibria. Accordingly, the effect that exogenous heterogeneity helps to rule out coordination failures, by ensuring that market segments needed for ex-ante efficiency are open in equilibrium, can be much weaker.
Finally, I show that even extreme exogenous diversity may be insufficient to eliminate inefficient equilibria. This holds also in the 1-d supermodular framework (Section 5.4). The finding highlights the importance of the precise form of technological multiplicity, and it complements the picture of the most interesting inefficiencies in (CMP)'s original model.
Related literature
(CMP)'s analysis motivated the present study. In a companion paper, Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001b) examined the case of finitely many buyers and sellers. An efficient equilibrium that does not hinge on special off-equilibrium bargaining outcomes exists whenever a, non-generic, "double-overlap" condition is satisfied. Generically, full efficiency is achievable only if off-equilibrium outcomes punish deviations, which requires unreasonable sensitivity to whether the deviating agent is a buyer or a seller. A particular and limited form of mismatch is sometimes possible due to the externality that a single agent can exert on others by "shooting for a better partner" through an aggressive investment. This type of coordination failure was first identified by Felli and Roberts (2001) . 8 Makowski (2004) allowed for general assignment games. He analyzed a continuum model in which single agents are, and expect to be, pivotal for aggregate market outcomes whenever the endogenous market has a non-singleton core. Makowski
showed that results similar to those of Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001b) hold in this case. In particular, hold-up and inefficienciesà la Felli-Roberts are possible. I prefer to follow (CMP) and assume that a single agent is not, and does not expect to be, pivotal for aggregate market outcomes in a very large economy. For example, such assumptions are in principle consistent with introducing small amounts of uncertainty, e.g. in the form of a small "probability of death" between investment and market participation. 9 Moreover, the main focus of the present paper is on whether trading options in endogenous markets necessarily limit or rule out coordination failures, which is a question that Makowski does not study. In a model with non-transferable utility (NTU) and continuum populations, Peters and Siow (2002) showed that there is an equilibrium that is Pareto efficient.
10 Under their assumptions (fifty-fifty sharing of an additive match surplus, ordered cost types) the equilibrium also maximizes aggregate surplus.
11 Acemoglu (1996) would be divided in the absence of payments, there are Walrasian, "personalized" prices Samuelson 2012, 2013 ) that correct these divisions such that payoffs correspond to the core element. Furthermore, in the language of the two-sided matching literature, core payoffs are stable and feasible surplus shares. Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame (1992) extended these equivalences to continuum models, in which the heterogeneous populations of buyers and sellers are described by nonnegative Borel measures on the spaces of possible attributes. Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame (1999) identified several equivalent conditions for perfect competitiveness of an assignment economy with continuous surplus function, in the sense that individuals (in the continuum model, infinitesimal individuals) are unable to manipulate prices in their favor. Among these conditions are that the core is a singleton and that all agents appropriate their full marginal product. Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame showed that perfect competitiveness is a generic property for continuum assignment games with continuous match surplus, 13 and that most large finite assignment games are "approximately perfectly competitive."
The linear program associated with the assignment game, the optimal transport problem, is the object of study of an extensive mathematical literature. Villani (2009) is an excellent reference that surveys a multitude of results, including the fundamental duality theorem that I use in this paper. More advanced topics comprise sufficient conditions for uniqueness of optimal transports/ Walrasian allocations (Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame (1999) were concerned with uniqueness of payoffs) and for purity of these assignments (that is, each type of agent is matched to exactly one type of agent from the other side), a delicate regularity theory, and many other things.
Equilibria which require that investments, in the two-stage model, are optimal with respect to a market-clearing payoff system for all ex-ante possible attributes are equivalent to hedonic equilibria in a hedonic pricing model (Rosen 1974 ) with quasi-linear utility (Ekeland 2005 (Ekeland , 2010 Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim 2010) . In this hedonic pricing model, any seller chooses a bundle of a seller and a buyer attribute at production cost equal to her cost for the seller attribute, and a buyer's utility from purchasing a bundle equals the gross surplus net of his cost for the buyer attribute. In hedonic equilibrium, sellers' production and buyers' consumption decisions must be optimal with respect to a market-clearing price system for all possible bundles. Using a convex programming approach, Ekeland proved existence and efficiency of hedonic equilibria. Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim simplified this equivalence between hedonic pricing and ex-ante efficient matching by relating both to the (linear) optimal transport prob-lem. Like Ekeland, they also established sufficient conditions for uniqueness and purity of an optimal matching (which combine generalized single-crossing conditions for the surplus function with mild conditions on the distributions of types), as well as a weaker condition that suffices for uniqueness. Figalli, Kim and McCann (2011) used advanced techniques from the regularity theory for optimal transport problems to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of monopolistic screening problems. Their results shed light on important earlier contributions to multi-dimensional monopolistic screening, such as Rochet and Choné (1998) .
Some less closely related papers analyzed how heterogeneous agents compete for partners through costly signals in the assortative framework. In Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009), investments are wasteful and may be used to signal private information about characteristics that determine match surplus (which is shared fifty-fifty). They studied how the heterogeneity of (finite or infinite) populations affects the amount of wasteful signalling. Hopkins (2012) examined a model in which investments signal private information about productive characteristics and affect surplus (investments are partially wasteful). His main results nicely identify comparative statics effects due to changes in the populations, both under NTU and under TU.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 3, I introduce the model and define ex-post contracting equilibrium. Section 4 contains the result on existence of ex-ante efficient equilibria. In the main part of the paper, Section 5, I study sources, forms and limitations of potential coordination failures. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Model

Agent populations, costs, and match surplus
There is a continuum of buyers and sellers. All agents have quasi-linear utility functions, and utility is transferable. At time t = 0, all agents simultaneously and noncooperatively invest in costly attributes. If a buyer of type b ∈ B chooses an attribute x ∈ X, he incurs a cost c B (x, b). Similarly, a seller of type s ∈ S can invest into attribute y ∈ Y at cost c S (y, s). B, S, X and Y are compact metric spaces, 14 and c B : X × B → R + and c S : Y × S → R + are continuous functions. If a buyer with attribute x and a seller with attribute y form a match at time t = 1 (ex-post), they generate a gross surplus v(x, y). The function v describes the gains from trade (or, in a "worker-firm" context, the surplus from joint production) for any pair of attributes. I assume that v : X ×Y → R + is continuous and that unmatched agents obtain a surplus 14 I suppress metrics and induced topologies in the notation.
of zero. 15 From an ex-ante perspective, the maximal net surplus that a buyer-seller
where
For all (b, s) ∈ B × S, jointly optimal attributes (x * (b, s), y * (b, s)) maximizing h(·, ·|b, s) exist because X and Y are compact, and v, c B and c S are continuous (the pair (x * (b, s), y * (b, s)) need not be unique). By the Maximum Theorem, w is continuous.
The heterogeneous ex-ante populations of buyers and sellers are described by Borel probability measures µ B on B and µ S on S. 16 The "generic" case with a long side and a short side of the market (more buyers than sellers, or vice versa) is easily included by adding, topologically isolated, "dummy" types on the short side. Dummy types b ∅ ∈ B and s ∅ ∈ S always choose dummy attributes x ∅ ∈ X and y ∅ ∈ Y at a cost of zero. x ∅ and y ∅ are prohibitively costly for all b = b ∅ , s = s ∅ , so that no real agent ever chooses them. The assumption that unmatched agents create no surplus yields v(x ∅ , ·) ≡ 0 and v(·, y ∅ ) ≡ 0. All statements about functional forms and properties of v, c B , c S and w consistently refer to non-dummy types and attributes.
Transferable utility assignment games
At t = 1, buyers and sellers compete for partners in a frictionless market with complete information and transferable utility (TU). This continuum transferable utility assignment game is characterized by the gross surplus function v 17 and by measures µ X on X and µ Y on Y that describe the heterogeneous post-investment populations. A stable and feasible bargaining outcome of such an assignment game consists of i) a surplus-maximizing (efficient) matching of µ X and µ Y and ii) core payoffs, for all attributes from the supports of µ X and µ Y (the existing attributes). 18 These payoffs yield a feasible division of surplus in all matched pairs, and they make the underlying matching stable. Surplus-efficiency of the matching is necessary for stability because 15 The latter assumption is made for simplicity only. A model in which it may be valuable that some agents stay unmatched even though potential partners are still available is ultimately equivalent.
16 I use normalized measures, which is common in optimal transport. Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999) worked with non-negative Borel measures. This is useful for analyzing the "social gains function" that plays a key role in their work. 17 As v is continuous, the framework is equivalent to those of Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame (1999) and Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, Section 3.5). 18 In ex-post contracting equilibrium, all agents choose attributes from these supports. See Section 3.3, where I also define the payoffs after a deviation by a single agent.
of TU. Furthermore, stable and feasible bargaining outcomes are equivalent to competitive equilibria (see Section 2 for a detailed explanation). The cooperative formulation has the advantage that one can focus directly on payoffs as divisions of joint surplus, without specifying individual utility functions.
As in (CMP), there is another relevant assignment game. It corresponds to the benchmark case in which buyers and sellers can bargain and write complete contracts before they invest, so that partners choose jointly optimal attributes. This assignment game is described by w, µ B and µ S , and its stable and feasible bargaining outcomes are ex-ante efficient.
In Theorem 1 below, I summarize results of Theorem 5.10 from Villani (2009) that characterize all stable and feasible bargaining outcomes of any given assignment game with continuous surplus. I use this characterization to define ex-post contracting equilibrium, which requires that individual investments are "best-replies" to the trading possibilities and bargaining outcome of the endogenous second-stage market, and to verify the existence of efficient equilibria. Moreover, I need the information that Theorem 1 (applied to (µ B , µ S , w)) provides about the structure of ex-ante efficient matchings for the study of potential coordination failures (in Section 5. for an efficient matching is to find a π
The dual program is to find payoff functions ψ * 
To find solutions ψ * X and ψ * Y , one may restrict attention to functions ψ X that are v-convex with respect to the sets Supp(µ X ) and Supp(µ Y ) and set
) reflects buyers' price-taking behavior with respect to market payoffs ψ Y for existing seller attributes. In any relationship, a buyer with attribute x can claim the gross surplus net of the seller's payoff, and he may optimize over all y ∈ Supp(µ Y ) (and vice versa for sellers).
iii) As v is continuous and Supp(µ X ) and Supp(µ Y ) are compact, any v-convex function is continuous, and so is its v-transform. 23 In particular, v-subdifferentials are closed.
iv) The v-subdifferential ∂ v ψ X is the set of those (x, y) for which the "stable" payoffs ψ X (x) and ψ Y (y) = ψ v X (y) are feasible, so that they might actually be generated by the given pair.
Theorem 1 has two parts. The first part states that efficient matchings and dual solutions exist ("sup" turns into "max," and "inf" turns into "min" in the statement 21 These pointwise inequalities must hold for a pair of representatives from the L 1 -equivalence classes of ψ X and ψ Y .
22 This is a generalization of the usual Legendre duality for convex functions. In that case, X = Y = R n and v(x, y) = x · y is the standard inner product in Euclidean space. 23 The proofs of these claims are straightforward. They also follow immediately from the proof of Theorem 6 in Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame (1992), who "v-convexify" a given dual solution to extract a continuous representative in the same L 1 -equivalence class.
of Theorem 1) and that the optimal values of both programs coincide. The second part shows that any v-convex dual solution ψ *
be interpreted as feasible surplus shares in all (pointwise, not just almost surely) pairs that are part of any efficient matching: the support of any π * is contained in the vsubdifferential of any ψ * X . This leads to a satisfactory formal definition of the stable and feasible bargaining outcomes of any given assignment game (Definition 3). 24 Moreover, Theorem 1 clarifies the structure of efficient matchings. Any matching π ∈ Π(µ X , µ Y ) that is concentrated on a v-cyclically monotone set is efficient (it is easy to see that the v-subdifferential ∂ v ψ X of a v-convex function ψ X is a v-cyclically monotone set).
A and y K+1 = y 1 , the following inequality is satisfied.
Theorem 1. The following identity holds:
π is optimal in the primal problem if and only if Supp(π) ⊂ Γ, a v-convex ψ X is optimal in the dual problem if and only if Γ ⊂ ∂ v ψ X .
Definition 3.
A stable and feasible bargaining outcome for the assignment game
is an optimal solution for the primal linear program, and the v-convex function ψ * X is an optimal solution for the dual linear program.
Ex-post contracting equilibria
I use subscripts to distinguish between matchings of cost types π 0 ∈ Π(µ B , µ S ) and matchings of attributes π 1 ∈ Π(µ X , µ Y ). In ex-post contracting equilibrium, individual investments must be "best-replies" (given the agent's cost type) to the trading possibilities and equilibrium outcome (π others' sunk investments. 25 However, attribute choices do not have to be optimal with respect to a market-clearing payoff system for all ex-ante possible attributes. Payoffs for non-marketed seller attributes, say, do not influence buyers' investment decisions. Hence, investment coordination failures are possible (compare the explanations in Sections 1 and 2). A buyer with attribute x ∈ X can match with any seller, leave the market payoff ψ * Y (y) = (ψ * X ) v (y) to her and keep the remaining surplus. That is, the gross payoff for x is
r X pins down payoffs after unilateral deviations to attributes outside of the equilibrium support (x ∈ X \ Supp(µ X )), and it coincides with ψ * X on Supp(µ X ). Similarly, a seller choosing attribute y ∈ Y gets gross payoff 26 I describe candidates for equilibrium investment profiles by measurable functions β : B × S → X and σ : B × S → Y , together with a "pre-assignment" π 0 of buyers and sellers. 27 The motivation for this choice will become apparent from Corollary 1 below.
In particular, different agents with the same cost type may choose distinct attributes. This must often happen if agents with the same type have to match with different types of partners, e.g. because distributions have atoms or type spaces are discrete. 28 An innocuous technical condition (Definition 4) ensures that post-investment populations are adequately described by the image measures of π 0 under β and σ, µ X := β # π 0 and µ Y := σ # π 0 .
29
25 Like (CMP), I assume that a single agent cannot affect aggregate market outcomes, see Section 2.
26 More precisely, in their model,
, and β and σ are "well-behaved," i.e. strictly increasing with finitely many discontinuities, Lipschitz on intervals of continuity points, and without isolated values. 27 The technical Lemma 8 in the Appendix shows that, for any π 0 , Supp(π 0 ) is an equivalent description of the sets of existing buyer and seller types, Supp(µ B ) and Supp(µ S ). 28 On the other hand, the optimal transport literature has found conditions that ensure "pure" optimal matchings in much more general situations than those considered in (CMP), see Section 2.
29 That is, for all Borel sets X ⊂ X and
Definition 4 corresponds to a "no isolated values" condition for β and σ in (CMP). In a regular investment profile, all agents choose attributes that do not get lost in the description (µ X , µ Y , v) of the attribute assignment game. Moreover, at t = 1, there are (almost) equivalent alternatives for each agent's attribute.
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Definition 5. An ex-post contracting equilibrium is a tuple ((β, σ, π 0 ), (π * 1 , ψ * X )), in which (β, σ, π 0 ) is a regular investment profile and (π * 1 , ψ * X ) is a stable and feasible bargaining outcome for
In the remainder of the paper, the functions r B and r S always denote net payoffs in ex-post contracting equilibrium. r B and r S are continuous (by the Maximum Theorem).
Two basic properties of equilibria Full appropriation games
Due to the absence of hold-up problems, every agent's equilibrium investment must maximize net match surplus contingent on the attribute of her equilibrium partner.
In particular, the investments of a buyer of type b and a seller of type s who are matched must be a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a hypothetical complete information game with strategy spaces X and Y and payoffs v(x, y) − c B (x, b) and v(x, y) − c S (y, s). I refer to this game as a "full appropriation" (FA) game between b and s. Jointly optimal attributes (x * (b, s), y * (b, s)) are always a Nash equilibrium of the FA game between b and s, but there may be other pure strategy NE.
is a Nash equilibrium of the FA game between b and s.
Corollary 1 motivates the use of a pre-assignment to describe potential equilibrium investments. One can restrict attention to (regular) investment profiles (β, σ, π 0 ) for which (β(b, s), σ(b, s)) is a NE of the FA game for all (b, s), tentatively set π 1 = (β, σ) # π 0 and check whether this investment behavior and matching can indeed occur in an equilibrium. In these cases, π 0 actually describes a matching of buyer and seller types that is compatible with the matching of attributes.
(CMP)'s "constrained efficiency" property (CMP) noted an indirect but useful constrained efficiency property of ex-post contracting equilibria. Attributes of the following kind cannot exist in the equilibrium market: the attribute is part of a pair of attributes that some buyer and some seller could use for "blocking" the equilibrium outcome in a world of ex-ante contracting (joint net surplus exceeds the sum of net equilibrium payoffs). Lemma 2 states the result in the notation of this paper. A very simple proof may be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 (Lemma 2 of (CMP)). Let ((β, σ, π 0 ), (π * 1 , ψ * X )) be an ex-post contracting equilibrium. Suppose that there are b ∈ Supp(µ B ), s ∈ Supp(µ S ) and (x, y) ∈ X × Y such that h(x, y|b, s) > r B (b) + r S (s). Then, x / ∈ Supp(µ X ) and y / ∈ Supp(µ Y ).
Efficient ex-post contracting equilibria
The stable and feasible bargaining outcomes (π * 0 , ψ * B ) of (µ B , µ S , w) describe how buyers and sellers would match and divide net surplus if they could bargain and write complete contracts before they invest (so that partners choose jointly optimal attributes (x * (b, s), y * (b, s))). Theorem 1 applied to (µ B , µ S , w) characterizes these ex-ante efficient outcomes and ensures existence. Theorem 2 below shows that any (π * 0 , ψ * B ) that satisfies the following very mild technical condition can be achieved in ex-post contracting equilibrium. 
Theorem 2 shows that (CMP)'s main existence and efficiency result does not hinge on supermodular surplus and cost functions, which imply ordered preferences and assortative matching. This is remarkable because single-crossing conditions took center stage in their proof. One may ask for which (µ B , µ S , w) stable and feasible bargaining outcomes are unique, but this (difficult) question is not of central importance for the present paper and has been studied elsewhere. 34 
Inefficient equilibria
In this section, I aim to clarify sources, forms and limitations of potential investment coordination failures. The core of the analysis consists of a sequence of in-depth studies of five examples in Sections 5.2 -5.4. It is useful, and important for the economic interpretation of inefficiencies, to distinguish two different manifestations of coordination failure. These are not mutually exclusive. First, agents might choose inefficient specializations and match with partners that they should not match with from the ex-ante view. Secondly, attributes in equilibrium partnerships could differ from jointly optimal ones.
Thanks to Corollary 1, one can restrict attention to equilibria of the following form: (β(b, s), σ(b, s)) is a NE of the FA game for all (b, s), and π * 1 satisfies π * 1 = (β, σ) # π 0 . In some cases, matchings of µ B and µ S other than π 0 are also compatible with the equilibrium.
35 I say that an equilibrium exhibits mismatch if it is not compatible with any ex-ante optimal matching. With regard to a compatible matching of µ B and µ S 32 By the Maximum Theorem, the solution correspondence for the problem (1) is upperhemicontinuous, so that a measurable selection always exists.
33 If π * 0 is pure, the equilibrium investments could also be represented as functions that depend only on an agent's own type (as in (CMP)). Even then, π * 0 still serves to describe π * 1 , the efficient matching of the attribute economy that supports the ex-ante efficient matching of buyer and seller types.
34 For example, Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame (1999) have shown that for a given continuous surplus function w and generic population measures µ B and µ S , core payoffs are unique. On the other hand, much research on optimal transport has been devoted to establishing sufficient conditions for unique, or more often unique and pure, optimal matchings.
35 This happens if buyers (say) with different types choose the same attribute and if this kind of attribute is matched with investments that stem from different seller types.
there is inefficiency of joint investments if a strictly positive mass of agents is matched with attributes that are not jointly optimal. In particular, an equilibrium is ex-ante efficient if and only if it has the following two properties: it does not exhibit mismatch, and there is a compatible ex-ante optimal matching for which there is no inefficiency of joint investments. Corollary 1 implies a simple sufficient condition for ruling out inefficiency of joint investments.
Corollary 2.
Assume that for all b ∈ Supp(µ B ) and s ∈ Supp(µ S ), the FA game between b and s has a unique NE (which then coincides with the unique pair of jointly optimal attributes). Then, ex-post contracting equilibria cannot feature inefficiency of joint investments.
I say that an environment displays technological multiplicity if FA games have more than one pure strategy NE for some (b, s) ∈ Supp(µ B ) × Supp(µ S ).
Consider first the following slight generalization of (CMP)'s model.
36
Condition 2 (The 1-d supermodular framework). Let X \{x ∅ }, Y \{y ∅ }, B \{b ∅ }, S \ {s ∅ } ⊂ R + , and assume that v is strictly supermodular in (x, y), c B is strictly submodular in (x, b), and c S is strictly submodular in (y, s).
37
Under Condition 2, mismatch is impossible. Every equilibrium has to be compatible with the positively assortative matching of buyer and seller types (Corollary 4 in the Appendix). In particular, technological multiplicity is necessary for the existence of inefficient equilibria (Lemma 13 in the Appendix).
Beyond the 1-d supermodular framework, mismatch is sometimes possible even if all FA games have unique NE (see Example 1 below). On the other hand, intuition suggests that the absence of technological multiplicity also restricts mismatch. In such cases, jointly optimal investments are continuous on Supp(µ B ) × Supp(µ S ), and (β(b, s), σ(b, s)) = (x * (b, s), y * (b, s)) must hold for all equilibrium pairs. In this sense, all pairs must invest according to the same, efficient, "technological regime." Moreover, any attribute choice displays the specialization for the intended match, but it also strongly reflects the agent's own type (see also footnote 40). Therefore, every seller s who is not too different from s must receive a "high" payoff just to ensure that investing optimally for the marketed attribute x * (b, s) (which is not very different from
is not a profitable deviation for s . These payoff bounds are particularly demanding for sellers s who would be more suitable partners (than s) for b ex-ante. Similar 36 No smoothness is assumed, cost functions need not be convex in attribute choice, and types do not have to be uniformly distributed on intervals.
37 See e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) or Topkis (1998) for formal definitions of these very wellknown concepts.
observations apply for y * (b, s) and buyers b , and for all equilibrium pairs. Ruling out each and any profitable deviation should be impossible if a lot of net surplus is lost through mismatch, especially if ex-ante populations are differentiated (and/or attributes very strongly reflect own cost types). Examples 2 and 3 serve to study this intuition. They show more rigorously how ex-ante differentiation tends to preclude mismatch in a particular model with twodimensional types and attributes. It should be noted that similar forces shape equilibrium matching patterns whenever agents invest according to NE 
In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, I turn to environments with technological multiplicity. (CMP)'s examples show that severe coordination failures can happen. In the environment that (CMP) consider, jointly optimal investments are increasing in the types of (assortatively matched) buyers and sellers. They jump upward once, at an "indifference pair" that can generate the same net surplus in each of two distinct NE of the FA game. In the under-investment equilibrium, the pairs with costs below those of the indifference pair make "low regime" investments, which still is a NE of the FA game between the partners. This inefficiency is ruled out, however, if (and only if) ex-ante populations are so heterogeneous that making low investments is not a NE of the FA game for the pairs with the lowest costs. In this case, the top pairs must make high regime investments. A possible jump from low to high attributes must then happen at the indifference pair (as net equilibrium payoffs have to be continuous in type). Section 5.3 illustrates how the problems caused by technological multiplicity are aggravated outside of the 1-d supermodular framework. In particular, mismatch can easily occur, potentially without any inefficiency of joint investments. The positive effects of exogenous heterogeneity (for ensuring that market segments needed for exante efficiency are open in equilibrium) still exist, but they can be much weaker than in (CMP).
I also demonstrate that, in contrast to what might be suggested by (CMP)'s examples, inefficient equilibria can exist even if agents are extremely heterogeneous (Section 5.4). The example, in which under-and over-investment occur simultaneously, also adds to a more comprehensive picture of the most interesting inefficiencies in the 1-d supermodular framework.
As before, all proofs are in the Appendix.
The basic module for examples
(CMP) generated an analytically convenient environment with technological multiplicity by defining gross surplus in a piecewise manner from two simpler surplus functions. This approach can fruitfully be pushed further. I systematically use a basic module that satisfies Condition 2 to construct examples, both with and without technological multiplicity. Apart from those in Section 5.4, the environments themselves do not satisfy Condition 2.
Symmetry just keeps the analysis reasonably tractable. None of the effects that I illustrate in the following sections depends on symmetry assumptions. Observe that for all b = b ∅ and s = s ∅ , there is a trivial NE of the FA game between b and s, namely (x, y) = (0, 0). This stationary point, which is not even a local maximizer of the net surplus h(·, ·|b, s), should be viewed as the only unpleasant feature of an otherwise very convenient example. Throughout Section 5, I focus on non-trivial equilibria, in which agents who prepare for matching with a non-dummy partner do not make zero investments. In other words, equilibria that arise only because of the pathological stationary point of the basic module are ignored! .
The maximal net surplus is
38 For any given µ B and µ S , one could replace attribute choice sets by sufficiently large compact intervals [0,x] and [0,ȳ] without affecting any of the subsequent analysis.
39 Eliminating the trivial NE explicitly by modifying the functions is possible but not worth the effort. It would make the following study a lot messier. 40 Observe that x * (b, s) strongly reflects b. In fact, the geometric weight on b is always larger than the one on s (as α < 2).
Moreover, the following identity is satisfied for all b, s, s :
In particular, if x * (b, s ) is an equilibrium investment of buyer type b (who prepares for matching with s ), then the net payoff for a seller s who optimally prepares for and matches (deviates to a match) with
Here, r B (b)+c B (x * (b, s ), b) is the equilibrium gross payoff that must be left to buyer b with attribute x * (b, s ). Analogous formulae apply for buyers.
Mismatch and its constraints in a multi-dimensional model without technological multiplicity
Consider the following "bilinear model." The functions v, c B and c S are additively separable and correspond to setting γ = α = 1 (in the basic module) for each of two relevant dimensions. FA games have unique non-trivial Nash equilibria, so that (non-trivial) inefficiency of joint investments is impossible. The functions v and w are bilinear (the formula for w follows from (3) and (4)). Bilinear surplus/valuation functions have been used in much classical work on screening and mechanism design. In the optimal transport problem, bilinear surplus corresponds to the classical case of quadratic transportation cost.
From (5), it follows that max y∈Y (v(x
. I allow that one coordinate of a type is equal to zero, meaning that any strictly positive investment in the corresponding dimension is infinitely costly (so that the agent makes zero investments in that dimension). This assumption is not fully compatible with the model of Section 3.1, but it serves to avoid unnecessary ε-arguments in Examples 1 and 2.
An example of mismatch
In Example 1, sellers (workers) are generalists who can invest in both dimensions. There are only two possible types, and these are completely ordered. As w ((b 1 , b 2 ), (s 1 , s 1 ) 
Otherwise, only the ex-ante efficient equilibrium exists. If a H < a 2 , then there is exactly one additional non-trivial, mismatch inefficient equilibrium if and only if 2 3
Otherwise, only the ex-ante efficient equilibrium exists.
In the inefficient equilibrium for a H > a 2 , all (0, b 2 )-buyers match with (s H , s H )-sellers, and sector 1 attracts both high and low seller types. Both conditions impose lower bounds on the ratio
in terms of how different seller types are. The first one is a participation constraint for (0, b 2 )-buyers. Given the payoff they have to leave to (s H , s H )-sellers, it must be weakly profitable for them to invest and enter the market. is close to 1, in which case the investments made by the more productive sector of buyers are very suitable also for (s H , s H )-sellers.
The limits of mismatch: a simple example
The example of this section is a variation of the previous one. Sellers are generalists, and they are on the long side of the market (in particular, there are sufficiently many sellers such that non-zero investments must be made in both sectors in any non-trivial equilibrium). However, their population is more differentiated than in Example 1. Buyers belong to one of two specialized sectors again, but they can be heterogeneous and it need not be the case that one sector is uniformly more productive than the other one.
bounded density, uniformly bounded away from zero, with respect to Lebesgue measure on [s L , s H ]. µ B is compactly supported in the union of (R + \{0})×{0}, {0}×(R + \{0}) and {b ∅ }. The restrictions of µ B to (R + \{0})×{0} and {0}×(R + \{0}) have interval support and admit bounded densities, uniformly bounded away from zero, with respect to Lebesgue measure on these intervals. Claim 2. Consider the environment of Example 2. The only non-trivial ex-post contracting equilibrium is the ex-ante optimal one.
The diversity of seller types and sellers' ability to deviate to marketed attributes from the other sector suffice to rule out any mismatch. The proof is indirect but constructive. Given an arbitrary candidate for a mismatch inefficient equilibrium, I identify some seller types who must have a profitable deviation.
The limits of mismatch continued: a fully multi-dimensional case
Checking for coordination failures by going through all possible cases, as in Example 1, is not viable in complex environments. Moreover, one usually does not know ex-ante optimal matchings explicitly 41 and has little, if any, a priori knowledge of structural 41 Closed form solutions exist only in very few, exceptional cases.
constraints for equilibrium matchings (by contrast, in Example 2, π * 0 is assortative in sufficient statistics, and any equilibrium matching must be assortative within each of the two sectors). In such cases, optimal transport results may be helpful, especially the characterization that a matching is optimal if and only if it is concentrated on a w-cyclically monotone set. One can derive necessary properties of matchings from equilibrium conditions and try to evaluate whether these preclude mismatch, both "locally" (for subpopulations, if these should be matched to each other) and "globally."
I give an example of this kind of analysis in the present section, for an environment that features truly multi-dimensional heterogeneity. The environment is chosen such that the regularity theory for optimal transport (for bilinear surplus, which corresponds to quadratic transportation cost) ensures that the ex-ante optimal matching is unique, pure (given by a bijection between buyer and seller types) and smooth. I show that under very mild additional assumptions on the supports, any smooth and pure matching of buyers and sellers that is compatible with an ex-post contracting equilibrium must be ex-ante optimal.
Example 3. µ B and µ S satisfy Condition 3. Furthermore, The idea of proof is as follows. I note first that whenever an equilibrium matching is locally given by a smooth map T , then T corresponds to the gradient of the buyer net payoff function, ∇r B (b) = 1 8 T (b) (Lemma 4 and Corollary 3). Then, I use a local version of the fact that both buyers and sellers must not have incentives to change investments and match with other marketed attributes from the other side. This yields bounds on DT (b) = 8 Hess r B (b) (the Hessian) and on the inverse of this matrix (Lemma 5). Taken together, these bounds force Hess r B to be positive semi-definite under the mild additional assumptions on supports (Lemma 6). It then follows that r B is convex, so that the matching associated with T is concentrated on the subdifferential of a convex function. This is a w-cyclically monotone set, and hence T is ex-ante optimal by Theorem 1.
The rest of this section contains the above-mentioned sequence of preliminary results. Throughout, η denotes a direction (η ∈ R 2 and |η| = 1) and · is the standard inner product on R 2 . Most importantly, T always stands for a one-to-one onto matching of buyer and seller types that is compatible with an ex-post contracting equilibrium.
Lemma 4. Let T be smooth in a neighborhood of b ∈ Supp(µ B ). Then it holds for all admissible directions η: 
and 3DT (b)
are positive semidefinite.
Lemma 6. Let T be smooth on an open set
U ⊂ Supp(µ B ). For b ∈ U , if T (b) 1 b 1 b 2 T (b) 2 + T (b) 2 b 2 b 1 T (b) 1 < 32, then DT (b) = 8 Hess r B (b) is positive semi-definite.
Technological multiplicity and severe coordination failures
The example of this section combines the one of Section 5.2.2 with an under-investment exampleà la (CMP). Population measures (and cost functions) are as in Example 2, 
42
Lemma 7. Let K ∈ N, 0 < α 1 < ... < α K < 2, γ 1 , ..., γ K > 0 and f i (z) = γ i z α i for i = 1, ..., K. For i < j, there is a unique z ij ∈ R + \ {0} in which f j crosses f i (from below). z ij is given by
Consider parameter constellations for which z 12 < z 23 < ... < z (K−1)K . In this case, (max i=1,...,K f i ) (xy) defines a strictly supermodular function in (x, y) ∈ R 2 + .
If the surplus for sector 2 were globally given by f 1 , the unique non-trivial NE of the FA game between (0, b 2 ) and (s 1 , s 1 ) would be (x, y) = 0, > 4 respectively. However, as in (CMP), the "low regime" investments still yield NE of the FA game for some range of b 2 and s 1 with b 2 s 1 > τ (and "high regime" investments still yield NE of the FA game for some range of b 2 and s 1 with b 2 s 1 < τ ).
Consider now a situation in which ex-ante efficiency requires that high cost investments are made in sector 2. This is the case if and only if (0, b 2,H ) is matched to a (s * 1 , s * 1 ) satisfying b 2,H s * 1 > τ in the ex-ante efficient equilibrium. In contrast to Example 2, w is not globally supermodular with regard to 1-d sufficient statistics, so that the problem of finding the ex-ante optimal matching is actually non-local and difficult, with potentially very complicated solutions.
43 However, for the present purposes, it is not necessary to solve the ex-ante assignment problem explicitly. If all sector 2 pairs invest according to the low cost regime (which is inefficient by assumption), then Claim 2 implies that (0, b 2,H ) is matched to the seller type (s 1,q , s 1,q ) who satisfies µ S ({(s 1 , s 1 )|s 1 ≥ s 1,q }) = q, for q = µ B ({b|b 1 + b 2 ≥ b 2,H }). In contrast 42 As (CMP) noted, the piecewise construction matters only for analytical convenience. One could smooth out kinks without affecting any results.
43 I briefly illustrate this difficulty by spelling out the 2-cycle condition in the Appendix.
to Example 2, this means a mismatch in the present case! This inefficient situation (in which efficient investment opportunities in sector 2 are missed, and some high type sellers invest for sector 1 while they should invest for sector 2) is ruled out if and only if the low regime investments are in fact not a NE of the FA game between (0, b 2,H ) and (s 1,q , s 1,q ) (and would trigger an upward deviation by at least one of the two parties). Whether this is true depends crucially on q, and hence on sector 1 of the buyer population. In particular, whether the coordination failure is precluded or not depends on the full ex-ante populations, not just on supports (as in (CMP)). Note finally that if the inefficient equilibrium exists, it exhibits inefficiency of joint investments if b 2,H s 1,q > τ , while all agents make jointly optimal investments if b 2,H s 1,q ≤ τ .
Simultaneous under-and over-investment: the case of missing middle sectors
In the 1-d supermodular example of this section, "lower middle" types under-invest and bunch with low types who invest efficiently, while "upper middle" types over-invest and bunch with high types who invest efficiently. In particular, the attribute market lacks an efficient middle sector. As in (CMP), there is no bunching in a literal sense: attribute choices are strictly increasing in type. It should rather be understood as bunching in the same connected component of the attribute market.
I use the construction of Lemma 7 and the notation introduced there. v has three different regimes of complementarity, i.e. K = 3, z 12 < z 23 and v(x, y) = (max i=1,...,3 f i ) (xy). Population measures are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure and have interval support. For simplicity, they are symmetric, i.e. µ B = µ S . I denote the interval support by I ⊂ R + \ {0}. By Corollary 4 in the Appendix, b is matched to s = b in any ex-post contracting equilibrium.
If surplus were globally given by f i (xy) (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) rather than v, then the non-trivial NE of the FA game for (b, b) would be unique and given by
The net surplus that the pair (b, b) would generate according to f i is w i (b) = κ i b 2α i 2−α i , where κ i = κ(α i , γ i ). For i < j, w j crosses w i exactly once in R + \ {0} and this crossing is from below (as for the functions f i , f j ). The type at which this crossing occurs is
I write x iij for the attributes that the indifference types b ij would use under f i , and x jij for those attributes they would use under f j . These are given by
, and
Thus, x iij and x jij depend on γ i , γ j only through γ i /γ j , and moreover, x jij /x iij depends only on α i and α j . It follows that
This ratio is greater than 1 (as 0 < α i < α j < 2), so that there is an upward jump in attribute choice where types would like to switch from the f i to the f j surplus function.
If parameters are such that b 12 < b 23 , then f 1 would be the best surplus function for b < b 12 , f 2 would be best for b 12 < b < b 23 , and f 3 would be best for b 23 < b.
However, the true gross surplus function is v with its three different regimes. The above comparison of net surplus from optimal choices for globally valid f 1 , f 2 and f 3 is sufficient to find the ex-ante efficient equilibrium if and only if the "jump attributes" actually lie in the valid regimes. Formally, this requires 
If b 12 < b 13 < b 23 , it is clear from (7) that x 112 < x 113 , x 212 < x 223 and x 313 < x 323 . I show next that the following two conditions may simultaneously be satisfied: i) (8) holds, ii) the jump from x 113 to x 313 (which is not part of the efficient equilibrium!), is also between valid regimes, that is x The next lemma shows that the sets of existing buyer and seller types, Supp(µ B ) and Supp(µ S ), may equivalently be described by Supp(π 0 ) for any π 0 ∈ Π(µ B , µ S ). 
The following two technical lemmas merely serve to verify that for a regular investment profile (β, σ, π 0 ), the assignment game (β # π 0 , σ # π 0 , v) and its stable and feasible bargaining outcomes, as defined in Section 3.2, adequately describe existing attributes and payoffs in the second-stage market. Proof of Lemma 10. First, define for all y ∈ Supp(σ # π 0 ),
By definition, ψ Y 0 coincides with ψ v X on the set σ(Supp(π 0 )) ⊂ Supp(σ # π 0 ), which is a dense subset by Lemma 9. Next, set for all x ∈ Supp(β # π 0 ),
and finally for all y ∈ Supp(σ # π 0 ),
By definition, ψ X1 is a v-convex function with respect to the compact metric spaces Supp(β # π 0 ) and Supp(σ # π 0 ), and ψ Y 1 is its v-transform. ψ X1 coincides with ψ X on β(Supp(π 0 )), and ψ Y 1 equals ψ v X on σ(Supp(π 0 )). Indeed, for any x = β(b, s) with (b, s) ∈ Supp(π 0 ), the set of real numbers used to define the supremum ψ X (x) is contained in the one used to define ψ X1 (x). Assume then for the sake of deriving a contradiction that ψ X1 (β(b, s)) > ψ X (β(b, s) ). Then, there must be some , s) ), which yields a contradiction. A completely analogous argument shows that ψ Y 1 (σ(b, s) , s) ) for all (b, s) ∈ Supp(π 0 ). Thus, ψ X (x) := ψ X1 (x) and ψ v X (y) := ψ Y 1 (y) are well-defined (and unique) extensions to a v-dual pair with respect to Supp(β # π 0 ) and Supp(σ # π 0 ).
As ∂ v ψ X is closed for the extended ψ X , it follows that Supp(π 1 ) ⊂ ∂ v ψ X . Hence (π 1 , ψ X ) is a stable and feasible bargaining outcome in the sense of Definition 3.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume to the contrary that there is some
which contradicts the assumption that β(b, s ) is an equilibrium choice of buyer b. The proof for sellers is analogous.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume to the contrary that x ∈ Supp(µ X ). Then,
The first inequality follows from the definition of r S , and the second holds by assumption. It follows that ψ * w (the w-transform of ψ * B with respect to Supp(µ B ) and Supp(µ S )) denote the payoffs for seller types in the ex-ante stable and feasible bargaining outcome. Remember the following implications of Theorem 1.
By assumption, it holds for all b ∈ B, s ∈ S that
and moreover that (β * , σ * , π * 0 ) is a regular investment profile. It is intuitively quite clear that the matching of attributes π *
, must be optimal. Indeed, from a social planner's point of view, and modulo technical details, the problem of finding an ex-ante optimal matching of buyers and sellers with corresponding mutually optimal investments is equivalent to a two-stage optimization problem for which the planner must first decide on investments for all agents and then match the two resulting populations optimally.
I next define the v-convex payoff function for buyer attributes ψ * X that is the other part of the equilibrium stable and feasible bargaining outcome for (β *
Optimality of π * 1 will be (formally) shown along the way. 44 For any x for which there
This is well-defined. Indeed, take any other (b , s ) ∈ Supp(π * 0 ) with x = β * (b , s ).
Since ψ * B is a w-convex dual solution, it holds that Supp(π *
, where the first inequality follows from the definition of w, and the second one follows from (9) . 
44 It should be kept in mind that there may be other stable and feasible bargaining outcomes for (β * # π * 0 , σ * # π * 0 , v). These are incompatible with (two-stage) ex-post contracting equilibrium however.
Moreover, the inequality in (9) implies for any x = β * (b, s) and y = σ * (b , s ) with
(10) and (11) imply that with respect to the sets β * (Supp(π * 0 )) and σ * (Supp(π * 0 )), ψ * X is a v-convex function, and ψ * Y is its v-transform. Furthermore (by (10)), the set (β * , σ * )(Supp(π * 0 )), which by Lemma 9 is dense in Supp(π * 1 ), is contained in the v-subdifferential of ψ * X . Completing ψ * X as in Lemma 10 yields the stable and feasible bargaining outcome (π *
It remains to be shown that no agent has an incentive to deviate. So assume that there is a buyer of type b ∈ Supp(µ B ) for whom it is profitable to deviate. Then, there must be some x ∈ X such that
Hence, there is some y ∈ Supp(σ * # π * 0 ) for which
As σ * (Supp(π * 0 )) is dense in Supp(σ * # π * 0 ) and by continuity of v and ψ * Y , it follows that there is some (b , s ) ∈ Supp(π * 0 ) such that
Hence in particular w(b, s ) > ψ * S (s ) + ψ * B (b), which contradicts (9). The argument for sellers is analogous.
Proofs for Section 5
Some basic facts about the 1-d supermodular framework
As is well known, strict supermodularity of v forces optimal matchings to be positively assortative for any attribute assignment game. The Kantorovich duality theorem can be used for a very short proof.
Lemma 11. Let Condition 2 hold. Then, for any (µ X , µ Y , v), the unique optimal matching is the positively assortative one.
Proof of Lemma 11. By Kantorovich duality, the support of any optimal matching π * 1 is a v-cyclically monotone set. In particular, for any (x, y), (x , y ) ∈ Supp(π * 1 ) with x > x , v(x, y)+v(x , y ) ≥ v(x, y )+v(x , y) and hence v(x, y)−v(x , y) ≥ v(x, y )−v(x , y ). As v has strictly increasing differences, it follows that y ≥ y . The positively assortative matching may assign buyers of the same type to different seller types, and vice versa, whenever µ B or µ S have atoms, but this does not affect the result.
Lemma 13. Let Condition 2 hold, and assume that for all b ∈ Supp(µ B ) and s ∈ Supp(µ S ), the FA game between b and s has a unique NE . Then every ex-post contracting equilibrium is ex-ante efficient.
Proof of Lemma 13. By Corollary 4, every equilibrium is compatible with the positively assortative matching of buyer and seller types. In particular, this is true for the ex-ante efficient equilibrium that was constructed in Theorem 2 (by (upper hemi-) continuity of the solution correspondence for (1), Condition 1 is automatically satisfied if (x * (b, s), y * (b, s)) is unique for all (b, s)). By Corollary 2, inefficiency of joint investments is impossible. This proves the claim.
Proofs for Section 5.1
Proof of Lemma 3. Any NE of the FA game for (b, s) must be a stationary point of
By behavior of this function on the main diagonal x = y for small x, as well as by the asymptotic behavior as x → ∞ or y → ∞, there is an interior global maximum. Necessary first order conditions are
Plugging in yields a unique stationary point apart from (0, 0), given by
This proves (2) . Net match surplus is
This proves (3) and (4). 
This proves (5).
Proofs for Section 5. 
So, the only candidate for an inefficient ex-post contracting equilibrium is the one in which only ((0, b 2 ), (s H , s H ))-, ((b 1 , 0), (s H , s H ))-and ((b 1 , 0) , (s L , s L ))-pairs exist. As sellers are on the long side, some (s L , s L )-types remain unmatched and make zero investments, so that r Plugging in r B (0, b 2 ) and rearranging terms yields 3 2
Finally, r B (0, b 2 ) ≥ 0 may be rewritten as
. Case a H < a 2 : As before, inefficiency requires the existence of both ((0, b 2 ), (s H , s H ))-and ((b 1 , 0), (s L , s L ))-pairs. Some ((0, b 2 ), (s L , s L ))-pairs necessarily exist as well. As in the previous case, the additional existence of ((b 1 , 0), (s H , s H ))-pairs would lead to an immediate contradiction. So, the only possibility is that all (s H , s H )-sellers are depleted by sector 2. It follows that r S (s L , s L ) = 0, r B (0, b 2 ) = is non-singular, all eigenvalues differ from zero. For the purpose of deriving a contradiction, assume that DT (b) has an eigenvalue λ < 0, with corresponding eigenvector η. From the first bound of Lemma 5 it follows that 3λ + η
It is straightforward to check that ψ X is a v-convex function with respect to the sets cl(β(I)) and cl(σ(I)) = cl(β(I)), that ψ Y is its transform, and that the pure matching of the symmetric attribute measures given by the identity mapping is supported in ∂ v ψ X . This yields a stable and feasible bargaining outcome for the attribute economy.
Given ψ Y , buyer type b 13 is indifferent between the option (choose x = x 113 , match with y = x 113 ) and the option (choose x = x 313 , match with y = x 313 ). Indeed, net payoffs from this are γ 1 x 
